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1 This paper was originally read at the 2007 Midwest Political Science Association.  It is currently being
revised for publication elsewhere , and is supplied here in the FSU Digital Commons as a working paper.
2 This is the case, e.g. for the literature interpreting Hobbes largely through rational choice theory and
games theory, which includes among its most important proponents and texts: David Gauthier, The Logic of
Leviathan (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1962); Gregory Kavka, Hobbesian Moral Norms and Political Theory
(Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1986); Jean Hampton, Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1986).  
For critical discussion of this literature, cf. David Boonin-Vail, Thomas Hobbes and the Science of Moral
Virtue (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1994); Edwin Curley, “Reflections on Hobbes: Recent Work on
His Moral and Political Philosophy”, Journal of Philosophical Research, v. 15 (1990); Sharon A. Lloyd,
“Contemporary Uses of Hobbes’ Political Philosophy” in Rational Commitment and Social Justice: Essays for
Gregory Kavka. Jules L. Coleman and Christopher W. Marris, ed.s (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
1998).
3 Michael Oakeshot makes an important hermeneutical point in claiming: “It is safe to say that every
interpretation of Hobbes’ moral theory leaves something that Hobbes wrote imperfectly accounted for.  But, it is
reasonable to distinguish between those interpretations which conflict with some (perhaps, many and repeated)
detached statements in the writings, and those which conflict with what may, perhaps, be considered the structural
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THE STATES OF NATURE IN HOBBES’ LEVIATHAN1
Gregory B. Sadler (gsadler@uncfsu.edu) 
Assistant Professor, Department of Government and History, Fayetteville State University
(Draft in progress: not to be quoted from or cited without the author’s permission. Copyright 2007 by Gregory B. Sadler) 
In Leviathan, as in certain of his other works, Thomas Hobbes develops and deploys a
constellation of notions of considerable conceptual refinement and illuminative power, and of
lasting, perhaps perennial rhetorical power.  These notions coalesce at their most central point,
the state of nature, or the natural condition of mankind.  A fairly simplistic or at least simplified
view of the Hobbesian state of nature forms an integral part of a fairly standard reading of
Hobbes, one prevalent in scholarship engaging Hobbes’ thought and doctrine not for its own sake,
but in order to provide a contrast against other thinkers, to fit Hobbes into a broader schema of
intellectual trends, tradition, or movements, or to diagnose Hobbes and his thought as the
precursor of something particularly unsavory arising specifically in modernity.  Pedagogical use of
Hobbes, of course, usually relies on, and in the process promulgates and perpetuates such a
simplistic reading.  That genre of simplistic reading of the Hobbesian’ state of nature can also be
found in scholarship engaging Hobbes in more focused and systematic ways, since studying other
portions of Hobbes’ thought can be rendered much easier and less messy by ignoring the
ambiguities and the puzzles arising when the state of nature is understood in relation to other
notions intimately connected with it in Leviathan’s actual theses, arguments, and discussions.2 
My central contentions in this paper are that close and sustained attention to Hobbes’ text3
principles of Hobbes’ view of things, though it is difficult to decide where to draw the line.” “The Moral Life in the
Writings of Thomas Hobbes”, in Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund. 1991), p.
332. In this study, though acknowledging the eminent reasonableness of Oakeshot’s distinction, I do not make that
distinction, regarding conformity to Hobbes’ actual statements pertaining to the diverse states of nature discussed
here as a  sine qua non of properly articulating Hobbes’ fundamental views.
4 I have suggested elsewhere that the central aim of Hobbes’ moral and political philosophy is to address the
“imperfect condition of all existing commonwealths. . . not by providing the intellectual framework for a radically
new social contract and establishment of sovereign authority, but by providing a new perfect and scientific
understanding and arrangement of existing civil society and sovereign authority through the resources of the
imperfect civil society.”  “The Laws of Nature as Moral Norms in Hobbes’ Leviathan”, Acta Philosophica, v.15, n.
1, p. 90 (2006).  
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allows discernment of at least five differing conditions which can be called “states of nature,” the
first of which is the state of nature the standard reading relies on, drawing largely on, and reading
in isolation from the larger work, chapter 13, “Of the Natural Condition of Mankind and
Concerning their Felicity and Misery,” but the most important of which to Hobbes is the actual
possibility of factional strife leading to the breakdown or disintegration of already existing but
from a Hobbesian view flawed civil society.  One implication of this distinction is that the first
state of nature is really a powerful rhetorical construct which does not hold up under sustained
scrutiny, but which does not for that reason drag down the remainder of the edifice of Hobbes’
thought.  Instead, the reverse happens: the heuristic utility of the rhetorical construct is sustained,
and enabled to do its work, by the rest of the argumentative and descriptive Hobbesian edifice, the
remainder of Leviathan, or at least the remainder of its first two books.  
Another implication of the reading I am advancing here is that the primary motivation of
Hobbes’ theory as a whole is, by producing what in his view is the first genuinely scientific moral
and political philosophy, to diagnose and remedy the causes and effects of factional strife in
already existing and imperfect commonwealths,4 not to adequately and realistically describe the
state of pre-political or pre-social humankind, nor the historical transition from a pure state of
nature to that of civil society.  Rather, he is concerned primarily to illuminate the sources of and
solutions to moral disagreement, escalation of claims and conflicts, breakdown of order, and this
requires and leads him to radical reexamination of human nature, production of a new
comprehensive theory of human nature, moral norms, and civil society, and advocation of
fundamental transformation of contemporary social institutions, structures, and arrangements in
line with the theory.  Comparatively, this reading, which accords factional strife a central role,
could be said to stress a fundamental similarity of aim and interest between Leviathan and Book
V of Aristotle’s Politics.
This study consists in exegetical development of a typology of states of nature
distinguishable in the text of Leviathan: 1) a rhetorical construct state of nature as war of all
against all, lacking any of the institutions of civilization and civil society ; 2) historically existent
5 EW, 124.  All references to Hobbes’ Leviathan are from The English Works of Thomas Hobbes.  William
Molesworth, ed. Vol. III, (London: John Bohn. 1839).  They are noted henceforth as EW. 
6 EW, 113
7 EW, 117
8 EW, 115, 124.
9 EW, 343.
10 EW, 113.
11 EW, 113.
12 EW, 113.
13 EW, 124.
14 EW, 125
3
“state(s) of nature” in pre-political societies, where family, patron-client, clan, or tribal structures
are in conflict with each other; 3) historically existent “state(s) of nature” within established civil
societies where, despite the establishment and enforcement of laws, citizens still remain in a
mistrustful condition vis-à-vis each other, i.e. concerned about possible crime; 4) the historically
existent “state of nature” governing foreign relations, i.e. the condition of states in relation to each
other; 5) historically existent and possible “state(s)” of nature that culminate in civil war with the
breakdown of civil society through factionalization.  I focus specifically and exclusively on
Leviathan in part to keep the study of a manageable size, and in part because Leviathan is a highly
systematic and mature presentation of Hobbes’ doctrine, in which each of these states of nature
are adequately developed.
I.  The Standard Reading State of Nature as Rhetorical Construct
Though they are filled out considerably by discussions in chaps. 10, 11, 17, 18, the most
general traits of the archetypical state of nature can all be found in chaps. 13 and 14 of Leviathan. 
First and foremost among these is that the “condition of mere nature”5 is a condition of always
potential, and presumably in many cases actual, conflict between all rational agents, in which
“every man is an enemy to every man,”6 a “condition or war of every one against every one,”7 or
“of every man against every man,”8 summed up later in a word, “anarchy.”9  Several particular
statements further specify this state or condition.   So long as there is the “known disposition”10 to
conflict, i.e. the disposition of one subject to engage in conflict with a subject evaluating whether
the first has such a disposition, “during all time when there is no assurance to the contrary,”11 they
are in the state of war.  When they are not in this condition, i.e. when one subject can have
assurances that another subject will not enter into conflict with him or her, they are in the state of
peace.  Practically speaking, however, having such assurances requires that the subjects have “a
common power to keep them in awe,”12 or as he will later say, “a common power set over them
both, with right and force to compel performance”13 of covenants, “to constrain those who would
otherwise violate their faith.”14 Once such a common power, the sovereign authority, is in place,
human subjects have left the state of nature.  Out of fear of the sovereign, but also fear of
15 Raymond Polin writes: “We see that there is a morality which could be called ‘natural’, or rather, an
infinity of natural moralities, since there are just as many as there are men living for seeking ends inscribed in
their passions, in their desires, towards the indefinite felicity that each pursues by ways that are his own.  We
cannot say, however, that there is no morality; there is, actually, so many moralities as there are men and ways of
living one’s life. . .”  Hobbes, Dieu, et les hommes (Paris: Presses Unversitaires de France. 1981), p. 216.
16 By the term “rhetorical construct” here, I mean simply a complex intelligible structure articulated in
words which has four key traits:  1) it purports to more or less adequately represent and mediate interpretation of a
portion of reality; 2) by the way in which it is articulated, and the argumentative uses to which it is put, it is
intended by its author to be found persuasive to its audience (which can, and in this case also involve it being
dissuasive with respect to other viewpoints and doctrines for its audience; 3) the construct not only provides an
interpretive schema, it is also itself reinterpretable, susceptible of being isolated and intelligibly employed outside
of its original intended context (i.e. 17th century England); 4) when the construct is closely examined and its
implications drawn out, it becomes clear that, despite its attractiveness, it cannot adequately represent the realities
it is purported to represent, and that its use in interpretation and argumentation will always remain to some degree
rhetorical. 
A considerable literature exists on Hobbes and the ambivalences and ambiguities of his relationship with
rhetoric.  For representative discussions and bibliography, cf. David Johnston, The Rhetoric of Leviathan: Thomas
Hobbes and the Political of Cultural Transformation. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1986); Tom Sorrell,
“Hobbes’ Persuasive Civil Science”, The Philosophical Quarterly, vo. 40, n. 160 (1990); Quentin Skinner, Reason
and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1996); Lodi Nauta, “Hobbes
the Pessimist?  Continuity of Hobbes’ Views on Reason and Eloquence Between The Elements of Law and
Leviathan”, British Journal for The History of Philosophy, v. 10, n. 1 (2002). Ch. 3 of Leo Strauss, The Political
Philosophy of Hobbes: Its Basis and its Genesis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1952) trans. Elsa M.
Sinclair, is invaluable as well.
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returning to the state of nature, they recognize and abide by personal and specific agreements
made with each other, and more impersonal, general, and fundamental agreements with each other
encapsulated in the laws of nature articulated in chs. 14 and 15 (and a few later chapters), even
when these go contrary to some of their desires, inclinations, and passions.
There are several other essential traits to the state of nature as Hobbes describes it.  Not
only is it a state of at least potential conflict between all human agents, it is also a state in which
there are no agreed upon, mutually recognized and abided by, moral norms, referents of moral
terminology, rules of inference or premises of moral reasoning and judgement.15  Hobbes also
represents it as a primitive condition in which, due to lack of cooperative efforts and security,
lacks all but a few of the amenities and improvements of civilization and common life.  Along with
the first trait, these second and third ones could be concisely expressed as the doctrine that the
Hobbesian state of nature is a condition anomic, amoral, and asocial.  Of course, when Hobbes’
most vivid descriptions of this state are interpreted as claims about actual human conditions and
then correlated to the very conditions of the possibility of his own development, articulation, and
publication of his theory, or when critical reflection is brought to bear on implications of the
second trait, deep running conceptual inconsistencies emerge.  One could dismiss, or at least
problematize or criticize Hobbes’ moral philosophy on this account.  Alternately, if one interprets
this Hobbesian state of nature as a rhetorical construct,16 and reads Leviathan as counterposing
civil society to actually existing, more determinate states of nature, which are not entirely pure
17 That is, they only partly embody the anomic, amoral, and asocial character of the RSN, which means that
strictly speaking, they are not anomic, amoral, and asocial conditions, except in two ways: 1) they are such for the
relationships between some agents, and 2) they always involve a potential risk for more relationships (e.g. in the
breakdown of groups) to more fully or more widely take on these characters.  
18 EW, 113.
19 EW, 115.
20 EW, 86.
21 EW, 87.
22 EW, 116.
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states of nature,17 Hobbes’ theory assumes greater overall coherence, and the extent and detail of
discussions in Leviathan become more intelligible.  
Examining Hobbes further remarks about the standard reading state of nature, which
henceforth will be called the “rhetorical state of nature” (RSN), will lead naturally into study of
the other four states of nature.  Turning to the third trait, the RSN’s entire asociality, Hobbes
depicts it at its extreme in this famous passage whose conclusion is perhaps Hobbes’ most oft-
quoted text:
In such condition, there is no place for industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and
consequently, no culture of the earth, no navigation, nor use of the commodities that may
be imported by sea; no commodious building, no instruments of moving, and removing
such things as require much force; no knowledge of the face of the earth, no account of
time; no arts, no letters; no society; and what is more, continual fear, and danger of violent
death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.18
Development of each of these arts or technologies, some of them necessary for even the most
primitive civilization and culture, would be precluded by war of all against all, a state of constant
insecurity and conflict, lacking any interpersonal or social grouping or association.  But does
Hobbes actually think this extreme condition exists?  He concedes at one point “though there had
never been any time, wherein particular men were in a condition of war one against the other,”19
and his very discussions of ways of honoring and dishonoring in ch. 10, religious beliefs and
ceremonies used in institution of commonwealths in ch. 12, and the very reasons for conflict in ch.
13 all presuppose development of some sustained level and some available products of civilization
and culture.  In a situation of entire asociality, it would seem impossible for most of the desires
central in Hobbes’ anthropology to even be conceived.  Some are those which tend to lead out of
the state of nature, to civil society, desires for  “ease, and sensual delight,”20 “knowledge, and arts
of peace,”21 “such things as are necessary to commodious living; and a hope by industry to obtain
them.”22  Others play central roles in Hobbes’ very account of conflict, not least the “general
inclination of all mankind, a perpetual and restless desire for power after power, that ceaseth only
23 EW, 85-6.
24 EW, 86
25 He argues: “whatsoever is the object of any man’s appetite or desire, that is it which he for his part calleth
good,; and the object of his hate and aversion, evil; and of his contempt, vile and inconsiderable.  for these words
of good, evil, and contemptible, are ever used with relation to the person that useth them: there being nothing
simply and absolutely so; nor any common rule of good and evil, to be taken from the nature of the objects
themselves; but from the person of the man, where there is no commonwealth. . .”  EW 41.  “Good and evil, are
names that signify our appetites and aversions; which in different tempers, customs, and doctrines of men are
different: and divers men, differ not only in their judgement. . . but also of what is conformable or disagreeable to
reason, in the actions of common life.  Nay the same man, in divers times, differs from himself.” EW, 146.
26 MacIntyre diagnoses an inconsistency in this: “The Hobbesian social contract is the foundation of social
life in the sense that prior to the contract there are no shared rules or standards; indeed the story of the contract
functions as some kind of explanation of how men came to share social norms.  But any exchange of words, written
or spoken, between men which it would be appropriate to characterize as a contract or agreement or making of
promises can only be characterized as so in virtue of there already existing some acknowledged and shared rule. .
.” A Short History of Ethics, p. 136.  The example of “available standards for interpreting the utterances of others”
MacIntyre highlights there have to do with promising or agreeing, but he is simply calling attention to a logical
minimum of already shared (though to be sure, not always honored) norms.  Most likely, any real individual
subjects will already share many norms in common.  Leo Strauss notes a similar embarrassment in “On the Basis
of Hobbes’ Political Philosophy”, in What is Political Philosophy and Other Essays (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press. 1959) p. 191.
27 EW, 115.
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in death,”23 particularized in competition for “riches, honor, command, or other power,”
“praise,”24 or the desire to seize the goods of others.
The second trait, when laid out in its extreme formulations, is belied by other passages of
Leviathan, and this reflects a deep, perhaps fundamental, tension in Hobbes’ theory as a whole,
one, however, not requiring full examination here.  Noting two moments of this tension suffices. 
First, he claims that in RSN, moral values and judgements are entirely subjective and prudentially
motivated,25 or even prior to institution or imposition of civil society, simply meaningless. 
Second, he writes as if moral values and judgments are nevertheless intelligible to, recognizable
by, though not agreed-upon by, different human subjects,26 who, e.g., are able to apprehend the
various laws of nature.  They grasp not only the desirability that they be implemented, but that
they, as Hobbes argues, embody and render precise the outlines of morality, even of generally and
traditionally acknowledged virtues and vices. 
Hobbes claims that, in the state of nature, nothing is unjust, reasoning: “The notions of
right and wrong, justice and injustice have there no place.  Where there is no common power,
there is no law: where no law, no injustice,” and that justice and injustice are “qualities that relate
to men in society, not in solitude.”27  Clearly if interpreted strictly, these claims are false by
Hobbes’ own lights, since competing, and thus intelligible and capable of being claimed or argued-
for, conceptions of what is right or wrong, just or unjust play a role in generating conflict, not
only in a civil society beset by crime or by factions, but even in the state of nature, where
28 EW, 78.
29 EW, 115.
30 Edwin Curley, attempting to preserve the Hobbesian state of nature in order to discuss recent game- and
rational choice- theoretical interpretations of Hobbes, concedes: “It is neither definitive of this condition, nor. . . a  
necessary consequence of it, that people should have no affective ties to any other people and no form of social
organization at all, or that they should not cooperate with one another to some extent.”  He concludes that such an
interpretation “requires us not to take the famous phrase ‘war of all against all’ quite literally, and to qualify the
equally famous claim that the life of man in the state of nature is ‘solitary, nasty, brutish, and short’” “Reflections
on Hobbes”  p. 175.  Making these concessions and modifications, however, already moves us from the pure RSN
into one of the other states of nature distinguished here, which should then be informed by Hobbes’ numerous
discussions of those conditions.
31 EW, 112.
32 EW, 128.
33 EW, 112.
34 EW, 78.
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disagreeing with another person is a sign of dishonor,28 which feeds into the third fundamental
motive of conflict enumerated in ch. 13, “glory” or vanity.  The first motive of conflict also
presumes that there are some notions of property or ownership, which Hobbes denies of the RSN,
claiming there is “no propriety, no dominion, no thine and mine distinct.”29 Again, this cannot
mean that strictly speaking there is no notion of property, but rather than one agent’s claims to
one’s own possessions will not be recognized by other agents, who will, however, want their
claims recognized, and will fight to enforce them. 
More than the other two motives of conflict, competition and diffidence, the third motive
of conflict, which as numerous commentators have pointed out, greatly intensifies the danger and
conflict in the Hobbesian state of nature, presumes that none of the three traits of the RSN, that it
is an anomic, amoral, and asocial condition, are fully realized.  Although in this state, there is
potential conflict, it cannot be conflict of every human subject against every other, nor are there
no interpersonal or even social ties in this state,30 or else it would not even make sense to speak of
a person being moved to conflict with another because of “signs of contempt, or undervaluing”,
which can be “either direct in their persons, or by reflexion in their kindred, their friends, their
nation, their profession, or their name.”31 Later, discussing the extent of the social contract, he
argues that not only can one not be obliged to accuse oneself, but that this extends to “those, by
whose condemnation a man falls into misery”, giving the examples of  “a father, a wife, or
benefactor,”32 all of which relations presumably exist not only in civil society but in the state of
nature.  One might grant this of parents and wives, since familial relations clearly exist in the RSN,
because the first and second motives of conflict are over “men’s persons, wives, children, and
cattle,”33 but contest that benefactors exist in the state of nature.  Yet, in ch. 10, Hobbes explicitly
discusses a host of modes of honoring or dishonoring other persons, some consisting in
benefaction, and concludes his enumeration by stating : “All these ways of honoring, are natural;
and as well within, as without commonwealths.”34
35 I am in agreement with Johnston’s argument that Hobbes’ fundamental goal was a fundamental cultural
and political transformation, and that what I delimit  here as the RSN “set the stage upon which the radical
reconstructive pretensions of his political philosophy could appear as a plausible act of political creation.” The
Rhetoric of Leviathan, p. 189.
36 EW, 114.
37 EW, 114.
38 EW, 114-5.
39 EW, 115.
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Two additional points support interpreting the entirely anomic, amoral, and asocial
condition of the state of nature as a rhetorical construct which supports Hobbes’ treatments of
four actual states of nature which properly understood, properly administered, and properly
functioning civil society will to some degree assimilate, replace, and prevent.35  The first point is
that, in ch. 13, after sketching the state of nature in its starkest contours and diagnosing its
essential causes in the three fundamental motives of conflict, the only argumentative support
Hobbes gives is to direct the reader’s consideration precisely to all four of the actual states of
nature picked out and discussed here.  
First, he notes that, even in civil society, “when he knows there be laws, and public
officers, armed, to revenge, all injuries shall be done to him,” one takes precautions not to be
harmed by fellow members of one’s own commonwealth, “accus[ing] mankind by his actions, as I
do by my words.”36 Second, Hobbes admits that he “believes [such a time or condition of war as
this] was never generally so over all the world”, but argues that native Americans “except the
government of small families, that concord whereof dependeth on natural lust, have no
government at all.”37 Third, he suggests that factional strife and ensuing breakdown of the fabric
of society allows us to picture the RSN. “[I]t may be perceived what manner of life there would
be, where there were no common power to fear; by the manner of life, which men that have
formerly lived under a peaceful government, use to degenerate into, in a civil war.”38 Fourth, he
appeals to the example of international relations, claiming, not entirely implausibly that sovereign
political entities, “because of their independency, are in continual jealousies, and in the state and
posture of gladiators, having their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed one another. . . a
posture of war.”39
The second point is that, given Hobbes’ appeals to these actual states of nature, he
evidently regards himself and his readers as already inhabiting and being subjects of currently
existing, though probably highly flawed, civil societies in which returning to a state of nature
remains a menacing possibility.  The central function then of Leviathan and indeed Hobbes’ moral
and political philosophy is not primarily to explain theoretically the factual arising of political
communities from either the RSN or, more plausibly, from pre-political communities, nor to
illuminate international relations, nor even to persuade individual subjects not to engage in
40 The Ideology of Order, (London:George Allen & Unwin. 1974) p. 190.
41 Two Hobbes-interpreters who have given considerable attention to the role and scope of  families in
Hobbes’ thought recognize differing degrees of organization, size, and types of order and relationships in the
Hobbesian families.  Preston King, in The Ideology of Order, regarding the “patrilocal” family as the essential
type, notes that “[i]t does and does not include slaves,” p. 179, and grants that “[t]he family, as a concrete,
corporate unit, impliedly entails every conceivable method of creating orders among individuals.” p. 180.  Phillip
Abbott argues for a typology of three different kinds of families, which he labels: 1) the empty shell patriarchal
family; 2) group marriage; 3) the autistic family.   “The Three Families of Thomas Hobbes”, The Review of
9
criminal behavior. Rather its systematically pursued primary goal is to provide improved
understanding of the roots of human conflict, a warning of the costs of factional strife, and a
definitive remedy for conflict to be applied to existing civil societies, an irresistible and
uncriticizable sovereign authority enforcing the laws of nature discoverable by reason.  This does
not mean that Hobbes’ theory cannot be legitimately employed, as it has indeed been, towards
these other ends, and exegetical discussion of actual Hobbesian states of nature will illuminate
them to some extent.  At the same time, each of them bears implications for the centrally
important matter of factional strife.
II. Families in the State of Nature and in The Commonwealth
A more realistic, and historically existent, state of nature is the stateless condition in which
the main agents of actual or potential conflict are larger and more complex than individual human
beings.  As noted in the last section, even in his ch. 13 discussion of the state of nature and the
fundamental motives of conflict, Hobbes explicitly characterizes at least some of the agents in a
state of war with each other as at the very least possessing households, “wives, children,” which
some will be tempted to and attempt to seize and others will have to defend, preemptively if
necessary.  The types of communities and interpersonal relationships in the pre-political state of
nature extend much wider than simply couples with children, including servants and even friends. 
In ch. 10, specific modes of relationships extend beyond the simply conflictual ones presented in
ch.13, to an extensive listing of modes of honoring and dishonoring found outside of
commonwealths.  The force of religion also functions and can structure relations prior to
commonwealths.  All of these allow human beings to be bound together in relationships, more or
less stable,“congeal[ed] into peace,”40  to use Preston King’s felicitious expression, but, since
based on the plays and structures of human passions, liable to dissolution.  Insofar as they remain
stable and reliable, these relationships modify our picture of the Hobbesian state of nature, which
is then no longer the RSN, anomic, amoral, and asocial, but rather a condition in which there are
agencies of unequal power and complexity.  
Within these agencies, which could, and historically do take shapes ranging from families,
powerful families with servants and clients, robber bands, clans, tribes, even religious
communities, there will be of course mutual association, some sorts of deliberation, rule and
obedience,41 some ways of preventing, adjudicating and reconciling intergroup conflicts, as well as
Politics, v. 43, n. 2 (1981).  Abbott correctly accords priority to the first type.
42 King argues, correctly in my view: “[Hobbes] believed that families. . . .had always existed – which means
that almost all men at all times had lived with one another. . . . Complete individual isolation was at all times
unlikely an improbable,” The Ideology of Order, p. 189.  He expresses his conclusions in a set of theses, which
include: “[Hobbes] believed individuals were almost always contained within some formal organization, whether
large (like the state) or small (like the family). . . social organizations, whether or not they have contained all
individuals at all times, have existed so long as men have existed,” p. 190.
43 This central facet of Hobbes’ political theory is clearly recognized by Hobbes interpreters including inter
alios Strauss, Oakeshot, Polin, King, Skinner, Lloyd, Schochet.  What these quite varied interpreters have in
common are essentially  hermeneutic approaches to Hobbes involving close, sustained, and systematically reflective
attention to his texts.  
44 On the paradox this produces and a possible  resolution of this paradox, cf. my “Laws of Nature as Moral
Norms.”  For criticism of my suggested solution, responses to criticism, and counter-responses, cf. Martin
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some generally recognized moral codes and distinctions.  These may not be, and in actually
existing groups, will not be entirely coherent, unambiguous, systematically worked out in their
entirety, and the members of the groups will be subject to the desires and temptations of
Hobbesian human beings.  But, within these groups, even if one’s lot is not particularly desirable,
one is seemingly better off than other inhabitants of this state of nature, individual human beings
who do not belong to a group, who are on their own, and who are faced not just with other
agents similar to them in both structure of motivation and power, but also with these relatively
more powerful, and perhaps well-organized groups.  
This state of nature is not a pure one as is the RSN, and several interesting tensions mark
Hobbes’ discussions of this pre-political state.  The first is that it appears that even outside of a
particular group, the state of nature is not an entirely anomic, amoral, and asocial war of all
against all.42 The second is that while describing the pre-political state of nature Hobbes invokes
groups at various points in Leviathan, and yet these groups are themselves structured, in terms of
authority and power, like smaller commonwealths.  Furthermore, his lengthy discussions of
dominion and commonwealth by acquisition and his insistence on the essential identity of
commonwealths by institution and by acquisition, suggest that the political community in many,
even most cases develops simply and naturally out of one pre-political group’s successful
hegemony and domination.43 The third is that the pre-political family (as well as some other
associations) continues on and acquires a legitimate place and function in civil society, as
institutions incorporated within the commonwealth.  At the same time, families, particularly
powerful families, remain possible sources of factional strife.  Each of these merit some brief
examination.
The historically existent pre-political state of nature is not as much of a moral vacuum as
the RSN.  Admittedly, aside from the laws of nature, which are not really effective, or even
particularly well understood before being institutionalized in a commonwealth (and in Hobbes’
view, still are not well-understood and articulated even in existing commonwealths),44 and the
Rhonheimer, Gregory B. Sadler, and Michael Zuckert, “Forum: Hobbes on Laws of Nature and Moral Norms”,
Acta Philosophica, v. 17, n. 1. (2007).  Oakeshot articulates and discusses a similar problematic in “The Moral
Life in the Writings of Thomas Hobbes,” and rightly resists temptations to simplify away the paradoxical and
perhaps ultimately incoherent basic elements of Hobbes’ texts.
45 EW, 154.  Oakeshot develops a very interesting, and textually supported thesis about honor,
distinguishing between the “morality of the tame man”, and “another line of argument, not extensively elaborated
[in Hobbes’ texts], but enough to push our thoughts in a different direction,” involving “the moralization of pride
itself,” and the figure of “a man who would find greater shame in the meanness of settling for mere survival than
in suffering the dishonor of being recognized a failure; a man whose disposition is to overcome fear not by reason. .
. but by his own courage,” “The Moral Life in the Writings of Thomas Hobbes”, p. 339.  He notes that this “is a
character which actually appears in Hobbes’ writings, and is, moreover, recognized there as a just character,” p.
340. Unfortunately, there is simply “a dearth of noble characters,” p. 342.  Leo Strauss provides a complementary
discussion of the transition from aristocratic virtue to bourgeois virtue in ch. 4 of The Political Philosophy of
Hobbes.
46 EW, 105.  Emphasis mine.  
47 EW, 128.
48 EW, 129.
49 EW, 129
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basic prudential and passional structures of human beings which generally lead them into conflict,
one would be hard pressed to find anything like a natural morality in theory intellectually or at
least affectively discernable by all or even most people.  Yet, Hobbes does make several
interesting sets of remarks which could be interpreted as recognition that some moral values or
distinctions exist and are recognized outside of as well as within particular groups in this state of
nature.  
One of these is his discussion of the “laws of honor; that is, to abstain from cruelty,
leaving to men their lives, and instruments of husbandry”, recognized and followed by “small
families,” who “rob and spoil one another.”45 Another arises from his discussions of religion,
whose “first seeds and principles. . .are only an opinion of a deity, and powers invisible, and
supernatural; that can never be so abolished out of human nature. . .”46 For all of his suspicion of
religion’s capacities to play a role in conflict, and his advocacy of state domestication of religion,
Hobbes nevertheless recognizes that in the state of nature, religion offers possibilities for
maintaining some level of concord, at least for some people.  In general, it is “fear of the
consequence of breaking their word”47 that brings people to observe covenants.  This fear can be
of “the power of spirits invisible”, which “is in every man, his own religion, which hath place in
the nature of man before civil society.”48 Accordingly, Hobbes writes: “before the time of civil
society, or in the interruption thereof by war, there is nothing that can strengthen a covenant of
peace agreed upon, against the temptations of avarice, ambition, lust, or other strong desire, but
the fear of that invisible power, which they every one worship as God; and fear as a revenger of
their perfidy.”49 Religion is seemingly one of the most resilient moral forces in the Hobbesian state
of nature.
50 EW, 187.
51 Gordon J. Snochet rightly criticizes Hobbes’ discussions of family in Leviathan as “rather strange and
strained, “interpreting them as “part of Hobbes’ attempt to deny the existence of status relationships in the
condition of ‘meer Nature.’” He concludes that “[i]t makes sense, ultimately, on the ground that in the prepolitical
world of the state of nature, parents were sovereigns.” “Intending (Political) Obligation: Hobbes and the Voluntary
Basis of Society”, in Thomas Hobbes and Political Theory, p. 64.  Cf. also Snochet’s earlier “Thomas Hobbes on
the Family and the State of Nature,” Political Science Quarterly, v. 82, n. 3 (1967)
52 EW, 188.  Abbott raises some of the problems with Hobbes treatment of the relationship between parent
and child as purely a relation of power and contract, and provides a convincing argument that “Hobbes might have
provided himself with a way out if he were to use gratitude, his fourth law of nature, as a basis for parental
authority,” “The Three Families of Thomas Hobbes,”  p. 245.
53 EW, 190
54 EW, 190
55 EW, 190.
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Turning to the second tension, it must be admitted that Hobbes takes a rather jaundiced
view of familial relations, albeit one consistent with his principles, mentioning at one point a
“natural inclination of the sexes, one to another, and to their children,”50 but for the most part
treating familial relations in a rationalistic and legalistic manner thought through in terms of
power, hierarchy, and dominion.51  One of the parents has dominion over the child, most likely
over the other parent, and establishes a chain of dominion over generations.  “He that hath the
dominion over the child, hath dominion also over the children of the child; and over their
children’s children.  For he that hath dominion over the person of a man, hath dominion over all
that is.”52 A like line of reasoning establishes similar dominion over servants. “The master of a
servant, is master also of all he hath, and may exact the use thereof; that is to say, of his goods, of
his labor, of his servants, and of his children, as often as he shall think fit.  For he holdeth his life
of his master, by covenant of obedience; that is, of owning, and authorizing whatsoever the
master shall do.”53  In cases Hobbes discusses, the condition of servitude generally stems from
someone who is conquered by another agreeing to submit to and serve the conqueror out of fear. 
Lacking this agreement, one who has been subjugated has “no obligation at all; but may break
their bonds, or the prison; and kill or carry away captive their master, justly.”54 Once submission
has been made, and “the victor has trusted [the servant] with his corporal liberty,”55 the
relationship of master and servant becomes instituted.  This could also be extended to cases where
a person, for economic motives or motives of identifying themselves with a prestigious superior,
willingly chooses to become a servant of a more powerful person.  Presumably, Hobbes would
also regard traditional patron-client relations as something analogous to servitude. 
The agents in an actual state of nature could range from small families, little more than a
couple and their children, to households comprising extended families with their own associated
families of servants and clients, to groupings as large as segmented clans or tribes.  So long as
there is some principle of ordering and hierarchy, Hobbes is willing to grant that “a great family if
it be not part of some commonwealth, it is of itself, as to the rights of sovereignty, a little
56 EW, 191.  And yet, this criterion should not, on Hobbes’ own account, present an impediment, since “as
for very little commonwealths, be they popular or monarchical, there is no human wisdom can uphold them, longer
than the jealousy lasteth of their potent neighbors.” EW, 250.
57 EW, 111.
58 EW, 185.
59 EW, 157.
60 EW, 157
61 EW, 158.
62 EW, 159.
63 EW, 221.
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monarchy.” The only caveat he introduces is: “yet a family is not properly a commonwealth,
unless it be of that power by its own number, or by other opportunities, as not to be subdued
without the hazard of war.”56 The second fundamental motive for conflict will actually cause
leaders of these groups to strive to extend their power, “by force, or by wiles, to master the
persons of all men he can, till he see no other power great enough to endanger him.”57 In this state
of nature, any group following out this logic of conflict successfully enough, while managing to
preserve internal order, will in fact end the state of nature, transforming it into a genuine
commonwealth by acquisition.  
Hobbes equates the two modes of producing commonwealths (or other types of
dominion), acquisition and institution, arguing that they fundamentally differ “only in this, that
men who chose their sovereign, do it for fear of one another, and not of him whom they institute:
but in this case, they subject themselves, to whom they are afraid of.”58 All that is required is that
people “confer all their power and strength upon one man, or upon one assembly of men, that may
reduce all their wills . . into one will,”59 to make the sovereign, as Hobbes says “bear their
person,”60 producing something more than simply consent or concord between people, “a real
unity of them all”61.  This can take place by an explicit institution, but it can also occur by
acquisition, “natural force”, and the examples he uses are precisely “when a man maketh his
children, to submit themselves, and their children to his government, by being able to destroy
them if they refuse; or by war subdueth his enemies to his will, giving them their lives on that
condition.”62
In the state of civil society, with the exception of a ruling dynasty, the family remains a
central though subordinate institution, one of the “private bodies, regular and lawful,”63 and it
retains its hierarchical structure, for its status as regular derives precisely from the members being
“united in one person representative.” The family, or more properly speaking, household (since it
can include not only servants, but also subordinate families of servants), in particular, the
representative head of the family, gives up some of the freedoms and rights the family would
possess in the state of nature, and correlatively, the order of the family is actually strengthened by
64 EW, 221-2
65 EW, 329.
66 EW, 224.
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being integrated within the commonwealth.  The family is a regular and lawful body because 
the father, or master, ordereth the whole family.  For he obligeth the children, and
servants, as far as the law permitteth, though not further, because none of them are bound
to obedience in those actions which the law hath forbidden to be done.  In all other
actions, during the time they are under domestic government, they are subject to their
fathers and master, as to their immediate sovereigns.  for the father, and master being
before the institutions of common-wealth, absolute sovereigns in their own families, they
lose afterward no more of their authority, than the law of the commonwealth taketh from
them.”64
The ch. 30 discussion of the various matters the state ought to take an interest in having its
citizens taught include some measures aimed at solidifying the structure of the family and
strengthening the analogy between rule and order of the state and rule and order of the family.  It
also recognizes that the family itself plays a central role in proper education and inculcation of
proper attitudes towards authority.
[B]ecause the first instruction of children, dependent on the care of parents; it is necessary
that they should be obedient to them, while they are under their tuition; and not only so,
but that also afterwards (as gratitude requireth), they acknowledge the benefit of their
education, by external signs of honor.  To which end they are to be taught, that originally
the father of every man was also his sovereign lord, with power over him of life and death;
and that the fathers of families, when by instituting a commonwealth, they resigned that
absolute power, yet it was never intended they should lose the honor due unto them for
their education.65
In the well-functioning Hobbesian commonwealth, there is an analogy between family
authority and sovereign authority, family and commonwealth, and at the same time, the family
structure is integrated within and supports the state, rather than threatening and weakening it by
presenting itself as a rival authority or by attempting to take over rule of the state.  Yet, the
Hobbesian household, which could encompass not only extended family, but also servants, and
extend its power through patron-client relations, friendships, wealth and reputation, will always
remain a potential source for factions.  Accordingly, he advises: “if a private man entertain more
servants, than the government of his estate, and lawful employment he has for them requires, it is
faction and unlawful.”66 Observing that “in nations not thoroughly civilized, several numerous
67 EW, 224.
68 EW, 114.
69 EW, 114.
70 EW, 297.  Hobbes adds: “In the making of a commonwealth, every man giveth away the right of
defending another, but not of defending himself.” EW, 297.
71 To the contrary, he writes: “As for the passions of hate, lust, ambition, and covetousness, what crimes they
are apt to produce, is so obvious to every man’s experience and understanding, as there needeth nothing to be said
of them, saving that they are infirmities, so annexed to the nature, both of man, and all other living creatures, that
their effects cannot be hindered, but by extraordinary use of reason, or a constant severity in punishing them. EW,
284
72 EW, 253.
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families have lived in continual hostility, and invaded one another with private forces,”67 Hobbes’
judgement is that either they were in commonwealths, and therefore were acting unjustly,
essentially engaging in faction, or “they had no commonwealth,” so that they remained in an
actually existing pre-political state of nature.
III. Criminality within The Commonwealth.
The examples Hobbes supplied as argumentative justification for the RSN indicate that
even in existing commonwealths, where there are laws and mechanisms of enforcement, so long
as they cannot entirely trust each other, and in cases where enforcement might not be able to
preserve rights to the extent one deems necessary, citizens still remain in something analogous to
the state of nature.  While relying for the most part on the state, they attempt to independently
guarantee their own security when traveling by arms and numbers, and when at home through
security devices.68 Hobbes even argues that locked chests evince unwillingness to entirely trust
one’s own children and servants.69  He also argues for a citizen’s right to act in self-defense
against criminal actions in civil society, on the basis that “no man is supposed bound by covenant,
not to resist violence.”70 This is not a pure state of nature in the same way asis the RSN, and
certain paradoxes or inconsistencies appear at first glance involved in Hobbes’ views.  It seems
strange that people should inhabit civil society, and yet still remain, as potential criminals, in a
state of nature in relation to each other, since the prime purpose of Hobbesian civil society is
precisely to supply a remedy and bulwark against the state of nature.  In a functioning civil
society, the laws and sovereign authority can of course do this in most cases, keeping the majority
of citizens who might be tempted to engage in crime from doing so, but Hobbes gives no reason
to assume that crime would cease altogether.71 Indeed, the very ways in which he thinks civil
society should deal with the inevitable crime, which both reflects a localized Hobbesian state of
war and threatens lapse into a more global state of war, maintain and even repair the social fabric. 
Properly understanding and addressing crime and punishments, the subject matters of ch. 27 and
28, is an integral component of the work of the sovereign in maintaining the social contract, and
observance of the laws of nature and the civil law, which as Hobbes maintains “contain each
other, and are of equal extent.”72
73 EW, 145.
74 The eleventh and fourteenth laws, “if a man be trusted to judge between man and man. . . that he deal
equally between them”, and “that they that are at controversy, submit their right to the judgement of an arbitrator,”
respectively, are also absolutely necessary for maintaining civil society, since, as Hobbes notes, if they are not
observed, the only other recourse for the parties involved is conflict, putting them into the state of war.
75 EW, 130.
76 EW, 130.
77 EW, 141.
78 EW, 145.
79 EW, 139.
80 EW, 126.
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The laws of nature specify requirements for common social life that, if not met, inevitably
set a person at odds with others and introduce the dynamic of distrust, hostility, conflict and
violence, escalating uncontrollably if unchecked, comprising the state of war.  When one is a
member of a commonwealth, in which other members do observe the laws, and in which there is a
sovereign authority, it is unreasonable for one to violate them.  Although Hobbes implies that
violating any of the laws of nature is criminal, since “injustice, ingratitude, arrogance, pride,
iniquity, acceptation of persons, and the rest,” the vices of character corresponding to breaking
specific laws, “can never be made lawful,”73 the third and tenth, for one set of reasons, and the
sixth and seventh for another set, are particularly important.74
The third law, “that men perform their covenants made,”75 in which, Hobbes writes,
“consisteth the fountain and original of justice,”76 is violated by any lawbreaking whatsoever, and
were it commonly violated in actuality, or even if citizens lost confidence that it would be in the
main respected, civil society would become impossible. Still, there is a type of unreasonable, or
deficiently rational, person, the “Fool” who acknowledges that people make covenants, and that
“breach of them may be called injustice, and the observance of them justice,” but who
nevertheless considers it reasonable for him to violate them if it benefits him. The tenth law, “that
. . . . no man require to reserve to himself any right, which he is not content should be reserved to
every one of the rest,”77 similarly expresses a moral norm violated by criminality.  Later,
summarizing the totality of the laws, Hobbes sets his finger on the essential nature of criminality in
a commonwealth:  “he that having sufficient security, that others shall observe the same laws
towards him, observes them not himself, seeketh not peace, but war; and consequently the
destruction of his nature by violence.”78
This consequence raises another important aspect, addressed by the sixth and seventh
laws, “upon caution of a future time, a man ought to pardon the offenses past of them that
repenting desire it,”79 and “that in revenges. . . . men look not at the greatness of the evil past, but
the greatness of the good to follow,”80 respectively.  When observed and enforced, these restrain
the responses of law-abiding citizens to criminality from moving towards the limitless conflict of
81 EW, 299.
82 EW, 298.  Hobbes makes this very explicit: “A man is assaulted, fears present death, from which he sees
not how to escape, but by wounding him that assaulteth him; if he wound him to death, this is no crime, because no
man is supposed . . . to have abandoned the defense of his life, or limbs, where the law cannot arrive time enough
to his assistance.  But to kill a man, because from his actions, or his threatenings, I may argue he will kill me when
he can, (seeing I have time, and means to demand protection, from the sovereign power,) is a crime.” EW, 285.
83 EW, 164.
84 EW, 137
85 EW, 296.
86 EW, 337. In ch. 17, Hobbes discusses particular “passions”, which would in contemporary parlance be
called attitudes or structures of assumption, which lead to crime, and are particularly dangerous: 1) those who
because of their wealth, hope to avoid ” punishment by corrupting public justice, or obtaining pardon by money, or
other rewards”; 2) those who have powerful or numerous family, and “popular men, that have gained reputation
amongst the multitude,” who hope to fight against those enforcing the law; 3) those who wrongly consider
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the state of war, and to even promote the possibility of reintegration of  reformed and repentant
criminals back into civil society.  Hobbes does, as mentioned above, acknowledge a right to self-
defense, extending to prudential preparations to resist or deter crime, but in civil society, the state
and not private citizens has the right and duty to punish criminals, for the purpose of “disposing
the delinquent, or (by his example) other men, to obey the laws.”81 Even though criminality
introduces the state of war into the heart of civil society, responses to it cannot be permitted to
reproduce its intensity of conflict, particularly the second fundamental motive of conflict,
“anticipation,” by which, in order to prevent or punish aggression, every person has the right to
“do whatsoever he thought necessary to his own preservation; subduing, hurting, or killing any
man in order thereunto”82 Instead, this right is given entirely to the sovereign to “do whatsoever
he shall think necessary to be done, both beforehand, for the preserving of peace and security. . . 
and when peace and security are lost, for the recovery of the same.”83
One last feature of Hobbes treatment of crime requires some discussion.  Precisely to
prevent lapses into the state of nature, Hobbes discusses in considerable detail how the sovereign
authority should deal with crime.  A significant part of this includes proper assessment of the
severity of the crime and the appropriate punishment.  The commonwealth itself is affected by
crimes against the citizens it is supposed to protect.  Accordingly, people can forgive debts, “but
not robberies or other violences”, because “robbery and violence are injuries to the person of the
commonwealth.”84 Indeed, in Hobbes’ view,  “in almost all crimes there is an injury done, not only
to some private men, but also to the commonwealth.”85 The most dangerous crimes, however,
calling for the most severe punishments, are those which particularly undermine the social fabric
not only by harming individual subjects and inducing fear in other subjects, but also by bringing
the sovereign authority’s power, not its mere power, but its power to enforce the laws of nature
and the civil law, into question and doubt, crimes that “proceed from malice to the government
established; those that spring from contempt of justice, those that provoke indignation in the
multitude, and those which, unpunished, seem authorized.”86  These are, it should be noted, also
themselves particularly wise, and contest the legitimacy of the sovereign authority and its officers; 4) those who
considering themselves wise, think their crimes will evade detection 
87 EW, 332. Hobbes specifies a list of matters concerning crime and justice to the citizenry, cf. EW, 329-330.
88 EW, 290.
89 EW, 330.
90 EW, 115.
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particularly dangerous because they involve or lead to the formation of factions and factional
strife.  Another significant part involves education of the citizenry by the sovereign authority, “a
general providence, contained in public instruction, both of doctrine and example.”87  Indeed,
Hobbes regards relying on the authority of a teacher rather than on one’s own judgement alone as
a factor which lessens one’s guilt,88 and correlatively, he regards teachings that lead others astray
as particularly grievous offenses. Again, the doctrines Hobbes will most severely condemn,
“opinions, contrary to the peace of mankind, upon weak and false principles,”89 are precisely those
which are used to justify faction.
IV. The State of Nature in International Relations.
If the state of nature can be found nowhere else, Hobbes argues, it exists in the relations
between sovereign political communities, i.e., states, and in relations between states and external
non-state agents.  This is not, however, a “pure state of nature,” for as with the pre-political
family or clan state of nature, this one differs from the RSN in that actual and potential conflict is
between communities which themselves are not anomic, amoral, and asocial, but rather involve
considerable cooperation and coordination between members.  An additional point of similarity is
that political communities, like pre-political communities, contain the potential of conflict arising
between its constituent members.  If and when conflict breaks out within the commonwealth, this
does not immediately produce the RSN, however, but rather one of the other actual states of
nature discussed here, criminality, faction, or independent families or clans.  Hobbes indicates
another vital difference, namely that in this state of nature, where the agents maintain “the posture
of war. . . . because they uphold thereby, the industry of their subjects, there does not follow from
it, that misery, which accompanies the liberty of particular men.”90
Dwelling overlong on Hobbes’ theory of international relations, on which a sizable
literature exists, is unnecessary.  Simply pointing out a few main features is sufficient here.  First,
aside from the important difference that the agents involved may vary considerably in power,
there are homomorphisms between foreign relations and the RSN that justify regarding it as the
closest approximation to the RSN.  The three fundamental motives of conflict, competition,
diffidence or anticipation, and glory or vanity, can be operative and self-perpetuating in interstate
relations, and Hobbes’ theory of human motivations, reasoning, and the passions, along with his
view of the sovereign as representing, bearing, and directing the wills of the members of the
commonwealth, allows interstate relations to be understood by analogy to interpersonal relations.
91 “Hobbes and the Irrationality of Politics”, Political Theory, v. 17, n. 3 (1989), p. 380.  Kateb also
observes: “The supreme irony is that Hobbes encourages nations to be what he warns individuals not to be: activist
uncontented and ambitious.  Even an unremitting concern for reputation (that is, for honor or prestige) is
encouraged because reputation is power.” p. 380.
92 EW, 154.
93 EW, 321.
94 EW, 342.
95 EW, 342.
96 Of course, it is possible for commonwealths to associate in what he calls “leagues”, which “are not only
lawful, but also profitable for the time they last” (200)
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One interpreter, George Kateb, goes so far as to claim that “international relations. . .is a
permanent condition, and it is the real referent of the thirteenth chapter.”91 Hobbes provides one
particularly explicit example of this analogy: “Cities and kingdoms. . . enlarge their own
dominions, upon all pretenses of danger, and fear of invasion, or assistance that may be given to
invades, endeavor as much as they can, to subdue, or weaken their neighbors, by open force, and
secret arts, for want of other caution, justly; and are remembered for it in after ages with honor.”92
A second feature is that commonwealths are analogous to individual human beings in the
state of nature in that they can also exercise prudential restraint over their natural passions leading
towards conflict.  In his discussion of the “diseases” a commonwealth is subject to, he includes
Bulimia, “the insatiable appetite. . .of enlarging dominion, with the incurable wounds thereby
many times received from the enemy,” and “Wens, of united conquests, which are many times a
burden, and with less danger lost, than kept.”93 And, although Hobbes declares that “the Law of
Nations, and the Law of Nature are the same thing,”94 so that sovereigns, representing their
commonwealths stand in relation to each other as do individual people in the RSN, his statement
that the law of nature “dictateth. . . to the consciences of sovereign princes and sovereign
assemblies; there being no court of natural justice, but in the conscience only,”95 does hold out
prospects for international cooperation structured by the other laws of nature, this requiring,
however, establishing some greater sovereign power over the states, one capable of compelling
obedience to the laws and thereby ending conflict.96  
A third and last feature important to note is that, despite the analogies between
international relations and the RSN, state agents and individual agents, the actual condition is not
only that of potential or actual conflict among states, within which potential conflicts among
individuals are contained, but also potential or actual conflict between states and non-state agents,
including individuals, either belonging to a state (which could trigger conflict with that state) or
not, as well as larger non-state communities.  Hobbes argues that “all men that are not subjects,
are either enemies, or else they have ceased being so, by some precedent covenants.  But against
enemies, whom the commonwealth judgeth capable to do them hurt, it is lawful by the original
97 EW, 305.
98 EW, 305
99 EW, 324-5. The final sentence of Book II indicates one intended audience: “I recover some hope , that one
time or another, this writing of mine, may fall into the hands of a sovereign, who will consider it himself. . .
.without the help of any interested, or envious interpreter; and by the exercise of entire sovereignty, in protecting
the public teaching of it, convert this truth of speculation, into the utility of practice.”  EW, 358.  Hobbes must
address many other readers, however, so as to convince them of the reasonableness and necessity of supporting
such a project.
100 EW, 224.  The question of the degree to which primarily ideological, religious, or class motives can
motivate conflict, specifically factional strife in Hobbes’ view is a particularly interesting and fertile subject for
further study and reflection, about which several interpreters have taken strong positions.
Deborah Baumgold, who stresses conflicts among elites in Hobbesian civil society, notes, quite correctly,
that “[a]bsent from [Hobbes’] analytic model is any notion that rebellion and civil war have any underlying
structural causes or teleological direction, as well as the associated conception of political actors as agents of such
historical forces”, but then goes on to advance a more controversial (and in my view, unsupportable) claim: “The
Hobbesian idea of a faction is incompatible with the concept of class. . . his discussion of the legitimizing function
of ideology contrasts with the Whig  picture of a conflict over ideology”.  “Hobbes’ Political Sensibility: the
Menace of Political Ambition, in Thomas Hobbes and Political Theory, ed. Mary G. Dietz. (Lawrence: University
Press of Kansas. 1990), p. 83.
S.A. Lloyd notes: “Hobbes was addressing the problem of maintaining social order in the face of
fundamental religious and moral disagreement over how people should live, and thus over the state’s proper ends
and operations.  Hobbes’ problem, to use the modern parlance of Rawls’ political liberalism, was one of how to
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right of nature to make war.”97 Accordingly, inflicting harm on innocent people who are not
members of a particular commonwealth, “if it be for the benefit of the commonwealth, and
without violation of any former covenant,”98 is not wrong in his view.
V. Factional Strife and the Return to the State of Nature.
The formation of factions and ensuing factional strife represents the last actual Hobbesian
state of nature, in many respects the most dangerous and deleterious one, and the one to which
the most discussion and thought is given in Leviathan. A considerable portion of the text,
particularly in chs. 17, 18, 22, and 29, explicitly discusses the ways in which faction arises and
how it may be prevented, and many of the discussions in other sections are implicitly oriented by
this end, precisely because Hobbes’ intended audience is not people in a pure state of nature, but
rather those inhabiting already existing commonwealths, “imperfect, and apt to relapse into
disorder,” a condition he aims to remedy by supplying “principles of reason. . . found out, by
industrious meditation, to make their constitution (excepting by external violence) everlasting.”99
These principles are, of course, the laws of nature, but consist also in the detailed and systematic
discussions comprising Leviathan’s entire second book.  
The possible sources and motives of factions are practically limitless, and even to attempt
a comprehensive summary of those Hobbes explicitly treats is a project beyond the scope of this
paper.  Just to mention a few, there are “factions for kindred. . . for government of religion, as
papists, Protestants, etc., or of state, as patricians and plebians . . . and of aristocraticals and
democraticals.”100 They can arise from any motives of human conflict which are permitted freer
ensure stable social cooperation in the face of competing comprehensive doctrines.” “Contemporary Uses of
Hobbes’ Political Philosophy”,  p. 142.
Richard Ashcraft makes and supports the claims that “Hobbes is cognizant of a relationship between
economic interests and ideology, and that these two factors comprise for him the ‘constituent causes’ of the English
Revolution.  In this relationship ideology functions as the active efficient cause while economic interest is the
passive material cause of that event,” He argues that though Hobbes does not use the term “class”,  he understands
“the phenomenon of class cohesion. . .  the fact that interests of people tend to coalesce into groups defined in
terms of a specific relationship to the means of economic  production,” while noting the danger of “us[ing] class
and faction as interchangeable terms.”  Political Theory, v. 6, n. 1. (1978)  p. 42
101 Polin, Hobbes, Dieu, et les hommes, p. 190.
102 Stephen Daniel offers the intriguing suggestions that, Hobbes’ “discussion of men in the state of nature
has two purposes.  First, it is meant to give a description of men considered apart from civil society, not apart from
human society.  Secondly, it is meant to highlight the fact that the sociable inclinations of man and the human
tendencies to develop ‘arts of peace’ are much too undependable to ground a political science.”  He concludes that
the state of nature is “the description of man as citizen, idealized in an abstraction from the civil or governmental
structure of civil society,” and that “the mere war of all against all describes men’s civil relations apart from
government, not their social relations.” “Civility and Sociability: Hobbes on Man and Citizen”, Journal of the
History of Philosophy. v. 18 (1980), p. 210.
Factional strife, on such a view, emerges in and intensifies a condition in which the governmental
structure does not sufficiently dominate civil society and social relations.  Accepting Daniel’s suggestions would
allow a reply to Alasdair MacIntyre’s criticism that: “To use the word social is to be reminded of one of the oddest
of Hobbes’ confusions, that he appears not to distinguish the state and society, to make political authority not
dependent on the prior existence of, but constitutive of social life.” A Short History of Ethics, p. 134.  The
Hobbesian state can be distinguished from the civil society which it dominates and integrates, and Hobbesian 
political authority is to some degree constitutive of social life, in that it modifies some institutions and social
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room for the development of their passional logic than is prudent: ambition, fear, honor and
dishonor, avarice, hatred, envy, anger, even, as noted earlier, indignation over criminality.  Polin
expresses the problem:
what is specific to man tends to irritate and to set itself at odds with living in a community,
whether it be reason, in the name of which each claims to uncover the faults or errors of
those governing and clings to destructive critique, or whether it be language, since speech
is a factor of sedition and faction, or whether it be even leisure. . . which provides time for
occupying oneself about glory and for speculating about the just and the unjust.101
 Factions by their very nature aim at contestation, conflict, and the extension of the power of
those engaging in them, either at the expense primarily of other subjects or groups of subjects
(including other factions, against which a new faction can be organized) but also thereby at the
expense of the sovereign authority, or directly at the expense of the sovereign authority and
thereby also at the expense of all those who rely upon it to keep the peace.  Put in another way,
every faction involves a breach of the social contract, a violation of at least one of the law of
nature and denial of the supreme authority and power of the sovereign.
By the time that factions have begun to emerge, and subjects enter into conflict with each
other, social matters are already tending towards the state of nature.102  As Hobbes writes,
relations and institutes, and creates and maintains the conditions for the possibility, of others.
103 EW, 164-5.  However, Hobbes does suggest at one point that properly directed and balanced fear could
cement the peace.  “[N]o popular commonwealth was ever kept up, but either by a foreign enemy that united them,
or by the reputation of some one eminent man amongst them, or by the secret counsel of a few, or by the mutual
fear or equal factions, and not by the open consultations of the assembly.” EW, 250. Emphasis mine
104 EW, 279.
105 EW, 262.
106 Hobbes wryly though polemically observes: “he is not the interpreter of [the written laws] that has written
a commentary upon them”, giving the reason that they do not bring matters to resolution, but only open room for
more conflict and contestation.  “For commentaries are commonly more subject to cavail, than the text; and
therefore need other commentaries; and so there will be no end of such interpretation. EW, 266. Earlier he remarks
that about the natural laws “we see so many volumes published, and in them so many contradictions of one
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specifically in reference to the likely unfavorable reception of his own political theory, “the most
sudden, and rough busling in of some new truth, that can be, does never break the peace, but only
sometimes awake the war.  For those men that are so remissly governed, that they dare take up
arms, to defend, or introduce an opinion, are still in war; and their condition not peace, but only a
cessation of arms for fear of one another; and they live as it were, in the precincts of battle
constantly.”103 Opinions and doctrines are in fact deeply involved in the development of factions,
and Hobbes stresses repeatedly that in a stable commonwealth, the sovereign authority must
properly educate the citizenry, and exercise control over the climate and content of publicly
presented opinion.  The sources of factions work analogously to those of “every crime”, which
stems from “some defect in the understanding; or some error in reasoning; or some sudden force
of passions,”104 and the detailed discussions in ch. 27 illuminate the (in Hobbes’ view, incorrect)
practical reasoning entering into factional strife.  In chs. 18, 29, and 30, he outlines what
particular doctrines need to be taught, and which need to be combated, in order to preserve the
commonwealth.  And, in ch. 17, “on the Liberty of Subjects” Hobbes waxes strongly against
specific doctrines and writers supplying in his view erroneous and noxious views on liberty, in
particular Aristotle and Cicero. 
One prime example of Hobbes’s approach is his treatment of natural laws’ relations to
civil laws, and their interpretation.  Not only is the sovereign authority accorded the sole right and
duty of making and enforcing the civil laws reflecting and institutionalizing the natural laws, the
sovereign and its ministers alone is authorized to interpret the laws.  Particularly of interest are the
potential interpreters Hobbes rejects.  He thinks that “considering there be very few, perhaps
none, that in some cases are not blinded by self-love, or some other passion, [the natural law] is
now become of all laws the most obscure; and has consequently the greatest need of able
interpreters.”105 To leave interpretation of the laws, right and wrong, justice and injustice, up to
individual subjects, and to allow them to contest the sovereign’s interpretation, paves the way for
uncertainty, partiality, and discord.106  Further complicating things are the ready supply of
doctrines and teachers giving their own interpretations of these matters.  Hobbes insists that “[t]he
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111 Johnston observes: “In some respects. . .Hobbes’ concept of the state of nature obscures almost as much as
it illuminates.  By appearing to insist that there can be no middle way between absolute order and absolute chaos,
his political analysis implies that every breakdown of sovereignty must be complete.  but this conclusion is
certainly not what Hobbes really believed, nor is it consistent with his interpretation of history.”  The Rhetoric of
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interpretation of the laws of nature, in a commonwealth, dependeth not on the books of moral
philosophy,” and even includes his own work, concluding that “[t]he authority of writers, without
the authority of the commonwealth, maketh not their opinions law, be they never so true.”107
Hobbes repeatedly stresses that factional strife risks casting the entire commonwealth back
into the state of nature, invokes its starkest form, the war of all against all, as one of only two
alternatives at several key points in Leviathan, discussions in which he particularly wishes to
stress the need for a irresistible and uncriticizable sovereign authority, and the requirement of
abiding by the laws of nature discoverable by reason.  For instance, “if the essential rights of
sovereignty. . . be taken away, the commonwealth is thereby dissolved, and every man returneth
into the condition, and calamity of a war with every other man (which is the greatest evil that can
happen in this life).”108 The consequences of lacking sovereign authority and a functioning 
commonwealth “ is perpetual war of every man against his neighbor.”109  And, following Greek
and Roman conceptions of liberty culminates in a condition “which every man should have, if
there were no civil laws, nor commonwealth at all. . . .For as among masterless men, there is also
perpetual war, of every man against his neighbor; no inheritance, to transmit to the son, nor to
expect from the father; no propriety of good or land; no security; but a full and absolute liberty in
every particular man.”110
These characterizations of factional strife’s fruits and end-points are easily identifiable as
the RSN.111  The actual state of a factionalized civil society, however, in which the sovereign
becomes unable to preserve its ascendency and the social order, a society eventually falling into
civil war, is no more a pure state of nature than are the other three actual states of nature
discussed earlier. It is true that, once the social fabric has been rent, there are greater incentives
and opportunities for factions to undergo internal factional strife, for principled or opportunistic
betrayals, power-plays, even splintering.  Hobbes sets his finger on this by noting that factions are
leagues, and that “[a] league being a connexion of men by covenants, if there be no power given
to any one man, or assembly. . . to compel them to performance, is so long only valid, as there
ariseth no just cause of distrust.”112 The dissolution of society would have  to proceed very far in
order to arrive at a pure Hobbesian state of nature.  Presumably before that, however, the
113 He does distinguish between them in a passage arguing that the inconveniences or incommodities of a
form of government are preferable to its lack, charging those who argue otherwise with overlooking “that the state
of man can never be without some incommodity or another; and that the greatest, that in any form of government
can possibly happen to the people in general, is scarce sensible, in respect of the miseries, and horrible calamities,
that accompany a civil war, or that dissolute condition of masterless men, without subjection to laws, and a
coercive power to tie their hands from rapine and revenge.”  EW, 170.
114 Daniel notes the converse side of this: “Societies are societies insofar as their members are bound to each
other for motives other than mutual fear.  Laws and governments do not create a society by uniting men as much as
they stabilize and make civil a society by maintaining that unity. “Civility and Sociability”, p. 210
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factionalized society would either have become prey to another commonwealth, or one faction
would succeed in dominating the others and establishing a new commonwealth by acquisition, or
the society would regress entirely to the pre-political state of nature of competing family, patron-
client, clan, or tribal groups.
One last set of points, also indicating how the factional strife state of nature is not an
entirely pure one, need to be made.  Although Hobbes does not say this in so many words,113
factional strife has an even greater potential for generating and perpetuating misery than the
natural condition of humanity in the RSN, for two reasons.  First, factions in a civil society can
draw upon many more resources, both material and intellectual or spiritual, for engaging in
conflict with each other.  Correspondingly, there is more at stake, and more to be sacrificed or
lost in a civil war than in a war of all against all.  Second, by virtue of belonging to a society
which becomes a field of contestation and conflict, the members of factions inevitably still share
much in common with each other, a common though perhaps ambiguous, overdetermined, and
incoherent moral vocabulary, sets of values, even ideals.114  This aspect makes civil wars even
more bitter than those fought against external opponents.  It also highlights a key feature of
factional strife.  Faction involves something determinately different than simply a return to a pre-
political state of nature or a the RSN, since its goal is not to destroy a civil society, but rather to
accord and appropriate to oneself or one’s group more a larger share of power, resources,
prestige, public space for promotion of favored opinions, desired actions or policies, or even
autonomy than is fair, or prudently allowable by the sovereign authority.  It may even extend to
attempting to take over rule of the commonwealth, as for example when the sovereign is an
assembly, “and a number of men, part of the assembly, without authority, consult a part, to
contrive the guidance of the rest.”115 But, in every case (the possible exception being genuine
anarchists, if such exist) factional strife is carried out in the hope that there remains something
substantial left to gain and enjoy once conflict has passed.  This hope in turn reflects the fact that
the condition of faction, the most dangerous Hobbesian state of nature, is not, and does not
assume, a pure war of all against all.
